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Abstract 
 
We present an approach for Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attack detection and mitigation in 
near-real time.  The adaptive unsupervised machine 
learning methodology is based on volumetric 
thresholding, Functional Principal Component 
Analysis, and K-means clustering (with tuning 
parameters for flexibility), which dissects the dataset 
into categories of outlier source IP addresses.  A 
probabilistic risk assessment technique is used to 
assign “threat levels” to potential malicious actors.  
We use our approach to analyze a synthetic DDoS 
attack with ground truth, as well as the Network Time 
Protocol (NTP) amplification attack that occurred 
during January of 2014 at a large mountain-range 
university. We demonstrate the speed and capabilities 
of our technique through replay of the NTP attack.  We 
show that we can detect and attenuate the DDoS within 
two minutes with significantly reduced volume 
throughout the six waves of the attack. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
     Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have 
received significant global attention, because they are 
increasing in frequency and severity [1].  DDoS occurs 
when attackers flood the target systems with huge 
amounts of traffic from many compromised systems, 
leading to interruption of the victim’s services [2].  
Direct costs to large organizations range from $50,000 
to $100,000 per hour, and indirect costs can total much 
higher.  We describe a system (NetBrane) designed to 
detect these DDoS in near real-time, and report on two 
different mitigation strategies based on our 
unsupervised outlier detection mechanism. 
The contribution of this work lies in its combination 
of multiple features.  First, our system is a near-real 
time monitor of all traffic on a network; that is, we can 
analyze traffic accurately without the need for 
sampling.  This is a major benefit because using the 
entirety of the dataset for anomaly (outlier) detection 
provides the best possible results in terms of accuracy 
[25].  Next, our outlier detection mechanism is 
unsupervised, removing any dependence on having 
labeled data.  It is impractical to obtain labeled data in 
many instances, especially in the case of a “new” attack 
whose profile is unknown.  This freedom from labels 
also lets our mechanism be adaptive in the sense that it 
only seeks to identify behaviors that are “unusual” 
when compared to the majority of traffic.  Such 
adaptivity allows for the potential to detect “new” 
attacks that supervised techniques cannot.  Other 
domains are also coming to the conclusion that 
unsupervised learning is an attractive approach when 
dealing with unlabeled data [26, 27]. 
     Detection and mitigation of DDoS is important 
because attackers increasingly use DDoS events as a 
smokescreen or distraction for more covert operations 
that allow them to carry out data breaches [3].  Our 
adversaries want not only to steal data or intellectual 
property (for later use or sale), but also to disrupt the 
operations of those targeted or impact their reputation. 
DDoS have been reported in the +1Tb/s range, driven 
by compromised Internet of Things (IoT) devices, such 
as digital video recorders and security cameras [4].  
Trends in the size of DDoS appear stable; growing at 
approximately 6% per year since 2017 [1].  But the 
median size is erratic, with cyclic growth.  It seems 
that when adversaries find new methods of attack, we 
see a new peak, followed by a decline when the 
method is mitigated (patched or blocked).   
     In 2019, 95% hit at 11.3Gbps or less.  While 
tsunamis make headlines, the “small” ripples can still 
cripple a business.  Our university was overwhelmed 
during a medium-sized DDoS in 2014 on two 10Gpbs 
connections to our Internet service provider (ISP).   
    In the last six months “the total number of attacks 
climbed by 84%, and the number of sustained (over 
60 minutes) DDoS sessions doubled…extremely long 
attacks posted a massive 487% growth” [5].  Attackers 
have also resorted to small multi-vector attacks (using 
more than one service or attack type at a time).  These 
“bit-and-piece” attacks beat detection thresholds 
because the targeted IP address receives only a 
relatively small number of responses in each organized 
campaign, leaving little or no trace.  The typical ISP 
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response of blocking all traffic to an entire IP prefix 
cannot reasonably be applied; it is costly, due to 
blocking access to various legitimate services of many 
customers.  We suggest that a finer grained detection 
and mitigation mechanism is required. 
     There are currently over 300 DDoS attack vectors, 
but the worst are those of “amplified reflection”, where 
adversaries send relatively small queries to a server, 
spoofing a victim’s IP address(es), and requesting a 
response involving a large amount of data. As a result, 
the server’s and victim’s network bandwidth will be 
flooded.  It is the amplification factor/ratio of inbound 
to outbound data that makes the attack both easy and 
dangerous.  Reflection attacks are occurring every 40 
minutes, with the largest to date being 1.35Tbps using 
memcached UDP reflection (50000:1) [6]. 
     In this paper, we study data captured from an actual 
NTP attack that occurred in 2014 on our campus with 
an amplification factor of 556, as well as a simulated 
attack in our network security lab.  We conduct 
forensic re-analysis using our methodology to detect 
outliers in the flow data and apply the result to mitigate 
the effects of the actual DDoS in near real-time. 
Specifically, we detect unusual behaviors in two steps: 
(1) Functional Principal Component Analysis (FPCA) 
combined with (2) K-means clustering. 
 
2. Related Work 
 
Anomaly detection methods can be classified into 
(1) signature-based and (2) profile-based [7]. Signature-
based methods use prior knowledge about 
characteristics of the anomaly of interest to identify 
suspects, and have several requirements, such as prior 
results from anomalies, the need for labeled data, and 
an external supervisor.  Many machine learning 
classification techniques are “supervised”, meaning that 
they need to be trained on a set of labeled data prior to 
use.  Examples of popular approaches are the Support 
Vector Machine, Bayesian Networks, Neural Networks, 
and Discriminant Analysis (surveyed in [7, 8]).  While 
these have been shown to perform well in certain 
situations where “known” anomaly data exists, the 
reliance on labeled data can be a difficult hurdle to 
overcome.  For the case of network traffic 
classification, “ground truth” knowledge may not be 
available or even exist, thus supervised techniques can 
only be applied when the true labels are approximated.  
Training on incorrectly labeled data greatly skews 
results [9]. 
In the case of recent or new DDoS attacks, 
knowledge of which behaviors are malicious is not 
known; we do not have labels.  Thus, supervised 
techniques cannot be applied.  Profile-based methods 
create representative “normal” traffic behavior, and 
anomalies are detected by deviations from this profile.  
While there may be higher false alarm rates, profile-
based methods are more promising due to their data-
driven flexibility and they may also detect previously 
unknown anomalies [9]. Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) is a widely used profile-based method which 
has been applied to detect traffic anomalies in DDoS 
data by decomposing network traffic into two 
components [24]. The anomalous subspace, which is 
noisier and contains the significant traffic spikes, is 
separated from the normal, which is dominated by 
predictable traffic. An individual observation is 
deemed an anomaly if its projection to the anomalous 
subspace is large.  A two-stage approach was 
proposed, using (1) PCA to identify potential 
anomalies, and (2) a meta-heuristic to group them [10].   
However, the use of PCA has been criticized due to 
issues pertaining to (i) false positive rates, (ii) traffic 
measurement aggregation, (iii) normal subspace 
pollution and (iv) correct anomaly identification [11].  
The third is important, as it highlights the need to 
choose which principal components represent “normal” 
behavior, and which ones represent the “abnormal”.  It 
has been demonstrated that some traffic captures do 
not lend themselves to this partition/selection; that is, 
all principal components contain abnormal behaviors, 
and thus this approach is not usable [28]. 
Clustering is another example of a profile-based 
method. Clustering has been applied to all traffic, 
comparing the centers of known “normal” traffic 
clusters to the centers of actual traffic, to try and 
determine if the actual traffic is not normal [12]. 
Unfortunately, this specific approach has only been 
applied to Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP) objects, not network flows, and requires 
known normal traffic data.  Clustering techniques have 
been used to characterize DDoS attack traffic (K-
means, Clustering Large Applications (CLARA), and 
Self Organizing Maps) [13]. K-means was found to be 
the most accurate for attack detection because attack 
traffic has strong similarity as opposed to the 
heterogeneity of normal traffic. In this research, 
“attack” clusters still mixed in legitimate traffic with 
malicious (between .4% and 2.04%). We believe this 
phenomenon can be eliminated by clustering only 
demonstrated “outliers”, not all traffic. 
To avoid the issues we have identified with PCA 
and clustering when applied separately, we will use 
FPCA (instead of PCA) and apply clustering to the 
resulting outliers [28] (that paper examined “scanner” 
behavior, where here we analyze a DDoS attack).  We 
perform classification only using the data that is given 
as input, making this technique well-suited for dealing 
with an unknown attack.  We suggest this is more 
appropriate than using a supervised approach trained 
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on data from a previous attack, as there are a wide 
variety of different attack vectors, and what was 
previously learned may not apply. 
When ground truth knowledge of true perpetrators 
in an attack is non-existent, the notion of “false-
positives” in anomaly detection arises.  Frequently, 
these are potentially controlled with risk assessment, 
computational trust, and reputation models (for a 
survey, see [14]).  Methods based on probabilistic risk 
assessments are widely used and seem to provide 
promising results [15].  We introduce a probabilistic 
approach to risk assessment which assigns a “threat 
level” to potential attackers. 
 
3. System Design and Dataset Description  
 
     The size of the organization does not matter when it 
comes to protection from attack.  Big, small, startup: 
hackers still want your data and they will stealthily 
poke holes in your network to find the access points.  
While “security as a service” (SECaaS) exists (e.g., 
Qualys, Sentinel, Sophos, Proofpoint, along with 
offerings from the major cloud computing companies 
such as AWS, Azure, Google) and can offer some 
protection, current solutions cannot benefit everyone; 
SECaaS is usually cloud-based without requiring any 
on-premise hardware or much software distribution.  
However, many organizations, such as government, 
military, and financial organizations, need to tightly 
control their data which is incompatible with SECaaS – 
(meta) data cannot be shipped off-premises.      
     To bridge this gap, we have built a system called 
“NetBrane” (network membrane, [29]).  NetBrane is a 
defense service where technologies are combined to 
construct a shield while leaving data and sensitive 
services on the premises.  Figure 1 shows the NetBrane 
architecture.  Key novelties of the project lies in the 
confluence of: (a) Software-Defined Networking 
(SDN) enabled small distributed footprint with 100G 
capture/filter capability for neutralizing DDoS (left 
side of figure), (b) elastic data analytics using near-real 
time flows and cloud capabilities (all analytics 
described in this paper are conducted in the section 
enclosed within the red box), (c) situational awareness, 
in terms of the global Internet information, and (d) 
proactive reconnaissance, by intelligent synthesis of 
information from multiple sources.  The design calls 
for NetBrane nodes to reside in points-of-presence 
(POPs), capturing and summarizing traffic at line 
speed, finding anomalies worthy of creating filter rules 
for, pushing these filters to the local SDN 
infrastructure, communicating with the appropriate 
POPs routing infrastructure to block traffic, while 
tunneling legitimate traffic to its destination.  We use 
SDN because it allows for dynamic software control of 
network design and operations.  Unfortunately we have 
discovered that openflow will not function at high line 
rates (>20gbps), and have had to design and implement 
a system called FlowRide (not described here). 
     At our large mountain-west university, we have 
installed optical taps to capture network flows (top left, 
Figure 1) at line rate.  FlowRide pushes those flows 
into message queues, which are read by our analytics 
engine (red box on right side of Figure 1) in near-real 
time where traffic is characterized (scanner or attack 
detection); data is saved in parallel to hadoop (HDFS) 
for data lake analytics.  We read these flows from the 
message queue in small time intervals and analyze 
them, applying multi-core (parallel R packages).  We 
have currently demonstrated resilience up to 400Gb/s. 
     The real-world raw data we consider in this paper is 
a collection of bi-directional flow records to and from 
Figure 1. NetBrane system architecture 
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our university, relating to the NTP service.  We focus 
on traffic between January 12 and January 25 of 2014, 
during the second half of which a true real-world 
amplified reflection DDoS was carried out (starting in 
the early morning of January 18).  This attack impacted 
the university in six waves (see Figure 4 for a plot of 
packet counts), with a wave defined by significantly 
decreased packet volume, or the monitoring system 
becoming unavailable. 
     The flow records contain timestamp, source and 
destination IP (SIP & DIP), source (SRC) and 
destination (DST) port, packet and byte counts.  We 
currently only analyze TCP data; we plan to consider 
UDP in future work.  We group information into one-
minute bins, and the full dataset covers roughly twenty-
thousand minutes.  As this is a real-world dataset, we 
lack “ground truth” knowledge of which SIPs are the 
victims (spoofed by attackers).  However, we suggest 
that ground truth is not necessary as we know that an 
amplified reflection DDoS occurred, and we only seek 
ways to alleviate damage. 
     The synthetic data we consider is very similar to the 
NTP attack data in terms of flow records.  This data is 
grouped into one-minute bins, but the total dataset only 
covers forty minutes.  This attack comes in one wave, 
for which we do have ground truth.  There are twenty 
true attackers, all with SIPs of the form 10.1.7.X, 
targeting one victim with SIP 129.82.138.136 on port 
80.  These attackers send approximately 20 million 
packets during the attack. 
 
4. Methodology 
 
Upon initialization of our analytics system, we 
aggregate the most recent thirty-minutes of Internet 
traffic (packet and byte count separately) into one-
minute bins.  For this initial thirty-minute window, we 
assume that we are not under an attack and have 
relatively “usual” traffic.  When one minute has 
passed, we “slide” this window to cover the new 
minute’s worth of data and drop the first observation 
from the previous window (i.e., the “oldest” minute of 
data).  With this mechanism, we always have the most 
recent thirty-minute time series of traffic volumes, 
allowing us to monitor for potential attacks in near-real 
time. 
In each iteration of the thirty-minute window, two 
thresholds (one for packets and one for bytes) are 
calculated and used for volumetric attack detection.  
The threshold is given by Equation (1), 
 
Thresh = max{Xt | t ɛ H} + cv⸱SE[max{Xt | t ɛ H}].  (1) 
 
In the above equation, Xt for t ɛ H is the time series of 
packets or bytes in the given window of history.  
SE[max{Xt | t ɛ H}] is the standard error of the 
maximum packet or byte count from a LOESS fit of 
the packet/byte time series in the window of history.  
Lastly, cv is a critical value determined from 
investigation of long-term (months) packet and byte 
distributions. 
When our window slides and gathers the new, most 
recent minute of packet and byte counts, these values 
are compared to the thresholds calculated in the 
previous window iteration.  That is, we check if the 
new packet/byte count exceeds their respective 
thresholds.  If they are below their thresholds, the 
thresholds are recalculated, and the process is repeated 
when a new minute’s worth of data is collected.  If at 
least one of the counts exceeds their threshold, we 
believe a DDoS has been detected, and begin our 
attack mitigation. 
The motivation for this threshold is as follows: 
when not under attack, previous “large” volumes and 
counts are considered acceptable, so we believe we are 
under attack from a DDoS when new data exceeds the 
largest value in the window of history by more than a 
scaled measure of the maximum’s variability.  This 
also captures the idea that we may see “normal” 
network activity that is larger than a previously 
accepted amount, but only see potential for a DDoS if 
new packet or byte counts exceed what we expect from 
historical variability of our data. 
When an attack is first detected, our system decides 
which destination port the attack is being launched on.  
This port is chosen based on the largest relative change 
in the minute at which the attack was detected.  That is, 
the system has already noticed a large increase in the 
traffic when aggregated across all ports, so we now 
focus on the specific port that saw the largest increase.  
We refer to this as the “attack port”, and then attempt 
to identify attacker SIPs on that port. 
For each SIP that contacted a DIP on the attack port 
in the given window, we construct a time series (by 
minute) of packet counts sent and received by that SIP.  
These time series are then used as input for Functional 
Principal Component Analysis (FPCA), and outliers 
are determined using the FPCA scores.  We perform a 
“two-pass” implementation of FPCA; that is, after 
identifying outliers from one application, they are 
removed from the dataset and FPCA is re-run to flag 
additional outliers.  This portion of the analytics is 
described in more detail in Section 4.1.  Once outlier 
SIPs – the potential attackers – are gathered, risk 
assessment is carried out and a threat level is assigned 
to each.  This threat level exists between 0 and 1 and is 
intended to represent the likelihood of a SIP being an 
attacker, with a value closer to 1 indicating malicious 
activity.  This risk assessment is described in more 
detail in Section 4.2. 
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After the first minute of attack analytics, we switch 
our “sliding” window to one that is a “growing” 
window.  That is, we do not drop the oldest 
observation when a new minute is gathered.  This is 
done so that we do not only investigate attack volumes 
when mitigating the attack.  Note that when the attack 
is first detected, we have 29 minutes of “usual” traffic, 
and FPCA finds outliers by identifying significant 
differences between SIPs in this period of “usual” 
activity and the attackers.  If the sliding window is 
used and the attack continues for a large amount of 
time, we may eventually encounter an instance where 
“usual” activity is drowned out by the attackers, or is 
non-existent, which hinders the ability of FPCA to find 
all significantly different SIPs.  With each new minute, 
the outlier detection procedure and threat level 
assignment are repeated. 
We then perform DDoS mitigation using the set of 
outliers found by our system.  For the SIPs flagged to 
be an outlier by FPCA in previous iterations of attack 
analytics, firewall rules are created to block their traffic 
from the network in future minutes.  That is, the SIPs 
with unusual traffic volumes are prevented from 
impacting the network any further, dampening their 
effect on the system.  In addition, previously 
determined outliers are not considered in subsequent 
FPCA analyses, so new potential attackers can be 
identified and blocked, leading to continued mitigation. 
To determine if an attack has stopped (or 
significantly declined), we set a limit on how long we 
expect to see traffic return to “usual” levels.  When 
new minutes’ data stay below the thresholds that were 
initially exceeded for one hour, we think that we are no 
longer under attack.  At this point, the analytics system 
removes all outlier SIPs from being blocked and 
returns to calculating the packet/byte thresholds until 
another attack is detected.  In addition, the “growing” 
window reverts back to a “sliding” window, snapping 
to the most recent thirty minutes of traffic.  One hour is 
chosen because it is double the size of our sliding 
window.  That is, we revert to monitoring the traffic 
rather than mitigating it when we are sure that volumes 
have returned to “usual” levels, and our thresholds will 
not be inflated by including attack traffic. 
 
4.1. FPCA + K-means 
  
     The procedure begins with application of FPCA in 
order to first classify “outliers” in the data. We 
construct an n × T matrix whose (i,t) entry is the count 
of packets sent and received by the ith SIP during the 
tth minute. FPCA models this as a mean series plus a 
linear combination of eigenfunctions, which are 
orthogonal curves representing the descending 
dimensions of variance in the data; that is, the first 
eigenfunction can be thought of as the direction of 
highest variability, eigenfunction two the second most 
variable, and so on. We employ the Principal Analysis 
by Conditional Expectation (PACE) algorithm of [16]. 
In order to select the number of eigenfunctions in our 
model, we apply the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC) and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) 
[17]. For the data presented here, these agree on 
parameter selection; but we acknowledge this may not 
always be the case. Context-specific factors should be 
considered when deciding which criterion is more 
appropriate [18].  
     To classify SIPs, we calculate each observed series’ 
FPCA scores, which are projections of the data onto 
the eigenfunctions. Each SIP has one score for every 
eigenfunction, and that SIP is flagged as an “outlier” if 
at least one of its scores exceeds a three standard 
deviation threshold from the mean (well-known due to 
its standard application based on Chebyshev’s 
inequality [19]). For example, from the n scores on the 
first eigenfunction, we can calculate the bounds xbar 
±3s; xbar is the mean score and s is the standard 
deviation. Any SIP whose first eigenfunction score lies 
beyond these bounds is flagged as an outlier.  We use 
the term “outlier” because we do not think all SIPs 
flagged by FPCA are attackers - these are SIPs that 
contacted the network in an unusual way, which can 
clearly include other activity.  Because of this, we 
carry out the second step of clustering these abnormal 
SIPs based on their rate of successful connections, 
where a “success” is characterized as the DIPs sending 
at least one packet back to the SIP. With this, we can 
investigate the cluster that exhibits behavior expected 
of an attacker, as our abnormal SIPs are now separated 
by their connectivity with the network.       
     In order to perform this clustering, we employ the 
K-means algorithm of [20]. The number of clusters in 
the application of K-means is chosen with the “elbow 
method”, which seeks the cluster amount such that 
adding one additional cluster would not have a 
significant impact on the fraction of variance explained 
(FVE) in the entire dataset [21]. K-means is run 
multiple times using randomly generated centers in 
order to assess sensitivity with respect to their centers, 
and we find that our data does not exhibit sensitivity to 
center selection. 
 
4.2. False-Positives and Risk Assessment 
 
     In each iteration of our “growing” window when 
under attack, a set of outlier SIPs is collected as 
potential attackers.  We do not suppose that all outliers 
are attackers, so we aim to introduce a quantitative 
mechanism to allow an operator to filter out possible 
false positives (non-attackers identified as outliers).  
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We call this mechanism a “threat level”, which is a 
value between 0 and 1, with a value closer to 0 
indicating a higher likelihood of a false-positive (non-
threatening). 
     To calculate this threat level, we first gather the 
total data sent and received by each outlier SIP and use 
these to construct a cumulative density estimate of 
“outlier” data.  Then, we take a sample of size 200 (or 
as many as we possibly can, should there be less than 
200) from the non-outlier SIPs, and construct a similar 
cumulative density estimate from their total volumes 
sent and received.  This gives us two cumulative 
density estimates: one for the outliers, and one for the 
non-outliers. 
     Next, for each outlier SIP we calculate its percentile 
in both cumulative density estimates.  That is, each 
outlier SIP has a corresponding p1, which is the 
probability that an outlier has volume less than or equal 
to that of the given SIP, and p2, which is the 
probability that a non-outlier has volume less than or 
equal to that of the given SIP.  The threat level is then 
calculated by Equation (2), 
 
     Threat Level = min(1,max(0, p1 – (1 – p2))).       (2) 
 
     This threat level is motivated by using the SIPs not 
labeled as outliers to determine if the outliers found are 
false positives.  If an outlier’s volume is low, it will be 
closer to the distribution of non-outliers, making us 
think that it is a false-positive.  For example, suppose 
an outlier SIP is a false-positive (non-attacker).  Then, 
the location of that SIP in the outlier cumulative 
density estimate will be close to the body of the non-
outlier cumulative density estimate, making p1 low and 
p2 high.  This translates into a threat level close to 
zero.  Compare this to the case where we have an 
outlier SIP that is an attacker.  This SIP will have both 
p1 and p2 large, translating into a larger threat level. 
     With each outlier being assigned a threat level, 
operators can be more measured in their “blocking” 
during an attack.  If an outlier with a low threat level is 
a known or acceptable SIP, then it may not need to be 
blocked from the network.  This decision would 
require specific knowledge of the network and we 
leave this decision to operators at this time.  In our 
analyses for this paper we always block all outliers 
collected. 
 
5. Results 
 
     We apply our attack detection and mitigation 
methodology to a simulated DDoS attack as well as an 
amplified reflective DDoS attack from 2014.  The 
simulated attack is discussed first, with focus on attack 
detection.  Ground truth from this event allows us to 
use this application of our methodology as validation.  
Following the synthetic event, we discuss the real-
world NTP attack with focus on attack mitigation. 
  
5.1. Simulated Attack 
 
     Our system first initializes on a thirty-minute 
window in which we are not under an attack.  The 
packet (top) and byte (bottom) count time series are 
shown in Figure 2, with the line separating the yellow 
region above indicating the thresholds for attack 
detection, as calculated in this window.  Note the 
observation circled in teal – this is the largest value in 
our window.  At this point, there is a mean packet 
count of 50 thousand and a mean byte count of 25 
million.  After initialization, the simulated attack was 
started, so the next minute of data will include attack 
traffic.  When the new data is received by the system, 
the aggregated packet and byte counts are compared to 
the previous thresholds.  Figure 3 shows both 
thresholds being exceeded (by the point circled in 
pink), which indicates that our system is under attack 
(also denoted by the red region above the yellow).  
Notice that the point circled in teal is the same value 
circled in Figure 2, showing the scale of this attack.  
We now know the simulated attack has begun, 
validating correct attack detection within its first 
Figure 2. Initialization, simulated attack Figure 3. Simulated attack detected 
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minute.  With this new minute of data, the average 
packet count rises to 4.4 million, and the average byte 
count rises to 6.25 billion. 
Next, we seek to determine the attack port by 
finding the port that had the largest relative increase in 
the most recent minute.  In this case, this is identified 
to be port 80, which is the actual destination port being 
targeted by the simulated attack. 
Table 1 shows the outlier SIPs along with their 
cluster center from application of K-means and threat 
level.  Note that all the attackers belong to the same 
cluster with low proportion of successful contacts, 
while the victim is alone in the cluster with a high 
proportion.  This separation is due to the victim 
appearing in the period of “usual” activity prior to the 
attack.  It was behaving in its usual way, reaching out 
to other IPs on the network and receiving responses.  
The attackers do not appear in this portion of the 
dataset, only coming into play during the most recent 
minute of the window.  They only contact the victim, 
and since they are performing a DDoS and sending 
large volumes, they receive no responses.    
We also see a separation between attackers and 
victim in the form of the threat level.  All attackers 
have threat levels of at least 88%, which is appropriate 
because we want a larger threat level to indicate 
malicious SIPs.  The victim has a threat level of about 
5%, which accurately reflects the fact that it is a false-
positive (non-attacker outlier).  We believe it is quite 
useful that this technique captures the victim because it 
likely removes a secondary step of further investigating 
the attackers to determine their target. 
When the next minute of data is gathered, we block 
traffic from all twenty-one of these outliers.  This 
significantly reduces the volume seen on the network, 
and returns packet and byte counts to below their 
respective thresholds.  This minute still involves attack 
traffic, but we have mitigated all of it since we have 
identified all malicious SIPs.  The same is true for the 
remaining minutes of the dataset – we stay below our 
thresholds and mitigate the DDoS event.  This analysis 
focuses on an attack that only comes in one wave and 
does not have enough “usual” traffic following the 
simulated event to fully discuss when to stop blocking 
the identified outliers from the network. 
 
Table 1. Simulated DDoS attack - outlier summary 
SIP Cluster Center Threat Level 
10.1.7.133 0 0.9961 
10.1.7.141 0 0.9903 
10.1.7.89 0 0.9785 
10.1.7.150 0 0.9779 
10.1.7.136 0 0.967 
10.1.7.20 0 0.967 
10.1.7.37 0 0.9554 
10.1.7.113 0 0.9533 
10.1.7.53 0 0.9327 
10.1.7.147 0 0.9286 
10.1.7.23 0 0.9272 
10.1.7.85 0 0.9259 
10.1.7.127 0 0.9203 
10.1.7.71 0 0.9189 
10.1.7.134 0 0.9148 
10.1.7.148 0 0.9134 
10.1.7.81 0 0.9108 
10.1.7.82 0 0.9033 
10.1.7.58 0 0.8978 
10.1.7.149 0 0.8801 
129.82.138.136 0.94 0.0527 
 
Figure 4. NTP attack packet counts - actual (blue), “strategy a” reduced (orange), “strategy b” reduced (green) 
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5.2. NTP Attack 
  
In applying our detection mechanism to the real-
world NTP amplified reflection DDoS attack, the 
packet threshold is immediately exceeded in the first 
minute of the first wave of the attack.  As this dataset 
consists only of NTP traffic, the step of determining 
the “attack port” is unnecessary.   
Recall our mitigation strategy: we “remember” the 
SIPs we flag as outliers and block their activity until 
aggregate traffic stays below our thresholds for one 
hour.  This attack includes six waves, each of which is 
more than one hour after the end of the previous (as 
shown in Figure 4).  Because of the big gaps between 
the waves, our analytics system treats these waves as 
six different attacks, as we “forget” outlier SIPs from 
previous waves.  Since we now have the knowledge 
that this is one attack, we aim to compare our current 
strategy to one in which outliers are not forgotten and 
their traffic continues to be blocked.  For the purposes 
of this discussion, we refer to the strategy of forgetting 
outliers after one hour of usual activity as “Strategy 
A”, and the alternative of never forgetting outliers as 
“Strategy B”. 
Figure 4 shows the time series (by minute) of 
packet counts sent and received on the network for the 
NTP DDoS event.  The actual packet count series of 
the event is shown in blue.  The series shown in orange 
is the remaining packet counts after mitigation Strategy 
A has been applied, and the series shown in green is 
after mitigation Strategy B has been applied; that is, 
these are the packet counts that would have been seen 
if our blocking rules had been in effect (actual packet 
count minus outliers’ packet count).   
First observe in Figure 4 that the series of packet 
counts for both Strategy A and Strategy B are well 
below that of the actual attack.  This visually indicates 
that our mitigation procedure is effective in reducing 
the impact of the attack.  Numerically, we can 
investigate total packet counts across the entire attack 
for all three series.  In the actual attack, approximately 
2.8⸱109 packets were sent and received across the 
network on the NTP service.  Applying Strategy A 
brings the total packet count to approximately 6.4⸱108, 
or 23% of the true attack (a 77% reduction in packets).  
Applying Strategy B brings the total packet count to 
approximately 2.4⸱108, or 8.7% of the true attack (a 
91.3% reduction in packets). 
 To more formally compare the packet counts of the 
attack and our two mitigation strategies, we perform 
paired t-tests for each of the three combinations [22].  
That is, we test for significant differences between the 
packet counts of the attack and Strategy A, the attack 
and Strategy B, and both strategies.  In all three of 
these tests, a p-value of less than 2⸱10-16 is reported, 
indicating strong statistical evidence for a difference in 
these time series.  From the visual inspection of Figure 
4, we certainly expected the reduced packet count 
series to be different from the true attack, but we also 
see a significant difference between Strategy A and B.  
To further investigate their difference, we calculate the 
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) “distance” between 
the two packet counts – a smaller distance implies a 
greater similarity in the series [23].  The DTW 
“distance” is calculated to be approximately 2.7⸱108.  
While this seems large, it is relatively small when 
compared to the DTW “distance” between the true 
attack and the two strategies: Strategy A is roughly 
2.5⸱109 away from the full un-mitigated attack, and 
Strategy B is at almost 3.5⸱109.  We expected Strategy 
B to be further from the true attack because of the 
larger packet reduction it achieved, but it is interesting 
that we observe such a significant difference between 
the resulting time series of Strategy A and B.  Strategy 
B clearly outperforms Strategy A.  Further discussion 
about these two strategies is included in Section 6. 
 This mitigation includes the steps of outlier 
detection, clustering, and threat level assignment in our 
analytics.  Recall that, for this analysis, we 
“remember” and block all outliers found in future 
traffic.  This makes the resulting clusters and threat 
levels calculated throughout the NTP attack 
independent of our mitigation.  This does not always 
need to be the case, as the system (or an operator) 
could block traffic from only outliers with a threat 
level above a specified threshold, outliers in certain 
clusters, or a combination of the two.  In any instance 
of this, fewer outliers would be blocked than were 
found, and the mitigation achieved would not be as 
large as that from Strategy A or Strategy B.  That is, 
the mitigation we are comparing here is between 
extremes – the true attack and blocking all outliers.  As 
such, we do not investigate the effect of blocking 
subsets of outliers in this paper.  For our analysis, the 
clusters and threat levels were used to better 
understand the types of behaviors that were apparent 
during the attack.  This is a benefit that was highlighted 
in the smaller simulated attack of Section 5.1, and one 
that an operator would be able to use as well. 
 
6. Discussion  
 
Our attack detection mechanism relies on the 
sliding-window approximation of real-time streaming 
data.  Thirty-minutes is selected as the window size 
because it is a near “worst-case” scenario in terms of 
how much data we need for our statistical procedures to 
be applicable.  We want our FPCA results to be 
accurate and stable, and we feel going below thirty 
observations for each series would breach this.  A larger 
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window could be kept for attack detection, but this 
would impact the thresholds in each iteration of the 
window.  This would also alter the set of outliers found 
when an attack is detected, as we would have more 
“usual” activity in the beginning of the time series. 
In Section 5.1, we applied our attack detection 
methodology to a simulated DDoS attack.  Our 
analytics detected the attack within its first minute of 
activity, and accurately identified the twenty attackers 
as well as the one victim.  The clustering results and 
threat level assignments clearly separated attackers 
from victim.  In the real-world attack of Section 5.2, 
we cannot expect to see such a distinct stratification of 
outliers because we do not have “ground truth” 
knowledge of the attackers.  We cannot check if they 
have significantly larger threat levels or appear in 
clusters distinct from the non-attackers.  Further, we do 
not know how many true attackers there are, so the 
threat level procedure we implement might produce 
“deflated” values for truly malicious SIPs. 
To demonstrate this, consider the early phases of an 
attack with many malicious IPs.  Imagine our 
unsupervised FPCA outlier identification produces a 
set of SIPs that is only a subset of the attackers 
(because some have not had enough time to fully 
behave like an attacker), so that some attackers are left 
in the non-outlier set.  In assigning threat levels, we 
compare probabilities from outlier and non-outlier 
cumulative density estimates, and having attackers 
included in the non-outlier set makes the non-outlier 
distribution closer to that of the outliers.  In turn, the 
approach think that outliers are more like “usual 
traffic”, producing a lower threat level.  Note that we 
attempt to reduce the impact of this issue by creating 
non-outlier cumulative density estimates from a sample 
of non-outliers, so it is possible that we will avoid 
attackers that have not yet been flagged as outliers.  
Even with this, we concede that it is possible for some 
attackers to be treated as non-outliers – this is very 
difficult to control for without ground truth knowledge 
of the dataset. 
We compared two mitigation strategies in Section 
5.2 – Strategy A involved “forgetting” outliers and 
resetting blocking rules when an attack subsides below 
initial thresholds for an hour while Strategy B 
mimicked a perfect memory and continual blocking.  
Strategy A reduced total packet counts of the event to 
23% of the original un-mitigated amount, and Strategy 
B reduced it to 8.7%.  Strategy B achieves greater 
packet reduction, as it immediately blocks SIPs that 
were flagged as outliers in previous waves.  We 
suggest Strategy B is most useful when a “botnet” is 
being used for an attack, because the IPs are “re-
engaging” after a pause.  By building up this botnet 
list, and completely blocking them, they cannot even 
“restart” the attack.  Further, this is why the reduced 
packet counts are identical in the first wave shown in 
Figure 4 (the green and orange series over plot) – there 
are no previous outliers for Strategy B to block.   
Note that mitigation achieved is not the only 
difference between these Strategies.  In all waves after 
the first, Strategy A allows traffic through that was 
previously being blocked, increasing the packet counts 
relative to Strategy B, while also providing a different 
set of SIPs for FPCA to use as input.  As a result, this 
also changes the threat level calculation, and 
introduces a greater chance for having attackers in the 
non-outlier set. 
This may seem to indicate that a “perfect memory” 
of outliers after an attack has been detected is superior, 
but this does not account for the true nature of the real 
world.  During an actual DDoS attack, there is no way 
to tell how many “waves” there will be and when they 
will stop.  Due to this, we initially recommend 
“forgetting” the outliers and returning to a sliding 
window (monitoring for the start of an attack) after one 
hour.  We allow for human operators to interact and 
configure the system to implement Strategy B for a 
while, and then to reset when ready. 
We do not suggest that our methodology can be 
used as a “set-and-forget” piece of software, but rather 
a strong supplemental tool to an operator or operating 
team.  Consider our mechanism detecting the start of a 
DDoS attack and informing humans.  Outlier SIPs will 
be blocked, mitigating the attack, while summary 
information (clusters and threat levels) are provided to 
operators every minute.  They then have at least one 
hour to investigate further and more accurately 
determine the nature of the attack.  For example, 
suppose a “false alarm” is detected (large packet/byte 
counts that do not truly represent an attack).  If the 
operator determines that this was a false alarm, they 
can stop the blocking and not have to wait an hour the 
system to return to attack monitoring.  Alternatively, 
should a true attack be detected, and operators think 
there may be waves, the one-hour limit can be removed 
so that larger and faster mitigation is achieved.  In all, 
we suggest the length of time it takes for the analytics 
system goes from attack mitigation back to detection is 
a tuning parameter that should be informed by specific 
knowledge of the network/institution. 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
We have demonstrated an unsupervised, adaptive 
technique for detecting and mitigating DDoS attacks 
on both synthetic and real-world datasets.  Dynamic 
thresholding is shown to detect the attack, and the 
FPCA+Kmeans approach mitigates the volume 
significantly (by more than 90%).  Such unsupervised 
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approaches are best suited for detection and mitigation 
of “unknown” attacks.  We have investigated two 
strategies for reducing packet and byte counts during 
an attack and suggest operators with network-specific 
knowledge can use both as appropriate.  Assignment of 
probabilistic threat levels to the outliers allows for 
better understanding of the SIPs identified. 
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